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REDEFINING THE ADVOCATE'S ROLE:
A CONTRACT THEORY OF LEGAL ETHICS
DAVID

I.

A.

ROBINSON*

INTRODUCTION

This article presents a theory of professional responsibility in
advocacy! based on the policy that a client, when represented by a
lawyer, should fare neither better nor worse than would a fair
minded person trained in the law representing himself. This theory
contemplates an ethical "contract" between client and lawyer un
der the following terms: "I, the lawyer, will zealously present your
case; but to the extent you thereby gain any unfair advantage, I
must rectify it." Client perjury, fraud, and misleading evidence
breach the contract and require the lawyer to take all steps neces
sary to eliminate their effects. This may require more than with
drawal from the case: the attorney also may have to disclose his cli
ent's deceit.
Critics argue that this philosophy emasculates the attorney
client privilege and thus penalizes the client for retaining counsel
and being candid. 2 These critics claim that an. ethical contract
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law;
member of the Massachusetts Bar; B.A., George Washington University, 1974; J.D.,
Washington University (Mo.), 1977.
L For recent treatises on legal ethics, see R. ARONSON & D. WECKSTEIN, PRO
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980); M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN AD
VERSARY SYSTEM (1975); G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1978); D.
MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER (1973). See also Fried, The Lawyer
as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060
(1976); Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 702 (1977); Essay, Three Discussions of Legal Ethics, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 452
(1977). For a collection of essays on the topic, see LAWYER'S ETHICS (A. Genson ed.
1980). For scathing attacks on lawyers, see J. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR (1978);
R. NADER & M. GREEN, VERDICTS ON LAWYERS (1976); A. STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR
ALL (1977) (nonlawyer author). Not surprisingly, these last three essays are directed
toward a popular audience.
2. See, e.g., Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1474-75 (1966) (law
yer may assist client who intends to perjure himself). See also Curtis, The Ethics of
Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 8 (1951) (lawyer may be justified in lying to judge);
Fried, SUPTa note 1, at 1081 (unjust for lawyer first to seek, then to betray, his client's
trust).
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which requires disclosure of the client's falsehoods may encourage
the client to withhold information or to lie during preliminary
discussions with his lawyer. Counsel thus might not know that his
client is testifying falsely at trial. 3 This article will demonstrate,
however, that the attorney-client privilege is an inappropriate
standard by which to judge ethical conduct. Imposing proper eth
ical restraints upon an attorney does not penalize the client but
rather constitutes a fair price which the client should pay for hav
ing a skilled advocate present his case. Special attention will be di
rected at the proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules), which embody this equitable approach. The article
concludes by supporting the position of the Model Rules that, in
certain circumstances, a lawyer must reveal his client's secrets to
avoid injustice. 4
II.

BACKGROUND

A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of his
client5 and represent him zealously.6 A lawyer also owes a duty of

candor to both the court and the legal system. 7 His representation,
therefore, must be within the bounds of the law. 8 While legal
scholars disagree as to where these bounds should lie, an imaginary
scale from one to ten best illustrates the nature of the dispute, a
score of one representing the greatest ethical duty and a score of
ten representing the least ethical duty. The lawyer who acts as an
officer of the court and fulfills his duty to assist the trier of fact in
ascertaining the truth of a matter earns a rating of one. 9 This duty
3. Freedman, supra note 2, at 1472. Uninhibited communication between law
yer and client can take place only if -the client foresees no possibility that his re
marks will be repeated by his attorney. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege:
Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464,
468-69 (1977).
4. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.1(b), (d) (Discussion
Draft, January 30, 1980) [hereinafter referred to as MODEL RULES]. For the text of
MODEL RULES, see 48 U.S.L.W. No. 32 (Feb. 19, 1980) (special supplement). See
also notes 92-94 infra.
5. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 4 [hereinafter
referred to as the CODE or CPR]. The CODE defines "confidences" as "information
protected by the attorney-client privilege" and "secrets" as "other information
gained in a professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolable
or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimen
tal to the client." Id. Disciplinary Rule 4-101(A).
6. ld. Canon 5.
7. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINION No. 146 (1947).
8. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7.
9. See, e.g., Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L.
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rises to the level set by the court for it is the court that empowers
the lawyer to walk into the courtroom and argue a case. 10 The law
yer, therefore, can undertake no activity inconsistent with the
court's objective: To search for the truth l l and to achieve justice.
In this regard, the lawyer investigates and presents, fully and accu
rately, the client's case. 12 Conversely, a rating of ten is accorded to
the lawyer who serves as his client's mouthpiece. 13 He does. that
which his client would do, short of breaking the law. In this situa
tion the client and lawyer are one entity:14 if the client wishes to
lie, the lawyer must permit him to do so. The lawyer complements
his client by filling gaps in the client's legal expertise and by
ignoring whatever disrespect the client may have for the court and
for his opponent. 15 At a rating of ten on the scale, neither ethics
nor professional responsibility exist since the lawyer is responsible
only to his client. Ethical restraints, such as forbidding a lawyer to
use perjured testimony or requiring him to reveal either adverse'
legal authority or his client's false testimony, shift the lawyer's per
formance from a rating of ten toward a rating of one. The apparent
effect of this shift is to penalize the client for retaining counsel. If
the client had neither sought legal advice nor revealed the true
facts to his lawyer, the client might have fared better. The client

REV. 1031 (1975); Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Con
fidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1966); Polster, The Dilemma of the Perjurious
Defendant: Resolution, Not Avoidance, 28 CASE W. RES. L REV. 3 (1977); Pye, The
Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth, 1978 DUKE L.J. 921; Uviller, The Ad
vocate, the Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 1067 (1975).
10. Curtis, supra note 2, at 7.
11. See Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), in which the Court stated, "The
basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth...." Id. at 416.
12. G. HAZARD, supra note 1, at 135; Rosett, Trial and Discretion in Dutch
Criminal Justice, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 353,371-75 (1972).
13. ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS, Introduction (1979) [hereinafter
referred to as ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS]; Noonan, supra note 9, at 1491. See gener
ally Curtis, supra note 2; Freedman, supra note 2.
14. "After the retainer, they are considered as the same person with their cli
ents." C.B. GILBERT, EVIDENCE 138 (London ed. 1752), quoted in 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at 543 n.3 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961).
15. The contract theory contemplates a duty to the court and the opponent, as
well as to the client. See Frankel, supra note 9, at 1038, in which the author states,
"Whatever doctrine teaches, it is a fact of interest that most criminal defense counsel
are not at all bent upon full disclosure of the truth." Professor Fried believes that a
lawyer need not concern himself with his opponent any more than a father with chil
dren to support should help alleviate famine around the world. Fried, supra note 1,
at 1066.
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could lie about the facts or deliberately misstate the law if he rep
resented himself. When represented by an ethical lawyer, how
ever, the client loses these options.

III.

THE ATTORNEy-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, CONFIDENTIALITY,
AND LEGAL ETHICS

The possibility that a client's position may worsen after he se
cures counsel requires an understanding of the attorney-client priv
ilege and its role in the system of ethical restraints. The privilege
'
has been stated as follows:
Where legal advice of any kind is sought ... from a professional
legal advisor in his capacity as such, . . . the communications
relating to that purpose, . . . made in confidence . . . by the cli
ent, . . . are at his instance permanently protected . . . from dis
closure by himself or by the legal advisor, . . . except [should]
the protection be waived. l6

A lawyer's ethical obligation regarding client confidences is broader
than the evidentiary privilege of attorney nondisclosure upon
which the ethical duty is founded. 17 Anything learned in the
course of representation, regardless of the source, may not know
ingly be disclosed. 18 Furthermore, the lawyer may not use such in
formation to the client's detriment.1 9
Obviously, a client is more likely to be candid with his lawyer
if the lawyer is barred not only from revealing adverse information
disclosed by the client but also from using this information against
the client in any way.20 It is equally apparent that the more a law
yer knows about the case, the more effectively he can achieve his
client's objectives. 21 Analysis of the attorney-client privilege's his
tory and policy, however, indicates that its principal purpose is not
to protect the inviolability of client secrets. The primary goal of the
privilege is to encourage individuals to seek counsel. 22 Public pol
16. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2292, at 554.
17. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 4-4.
18. Id.
19. Id. Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B)(2).
20. E. W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 175
(2d ed. 1972).
21. Id.
22. Annesley v. Earl of Angelsea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1129, 1225 (1743), in which
the court stated that "An increase of legal business and the inabilities of the parties
to transact that business themselves, made it necessary for them to employ ... other
persons who might transact that business for them." E.W. CLEARY, supra note 20, at
175 n.3. See also Wade v. Ridley, 87 Me. 368, 373, 32 A. 975, 976 (1895):
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icy favors the handling of litigation by lawyers, rather than by liti
gants, to ensure more just and expeditious results. 23 Representa
tion by lawyers equalizes the opposing litigant's strength 24 since
the power derived from representation by a lawyer offsets the cli
ent's weakness. 25
Originally, as with other evidentiary privileges, there also was
concern about the corruption of family relations and quasi-family
relations, such as those existing between physician and patient and
between attorney and client. 26 Preservation of these relations de
manded the fullest "uberrima jides,"27 or fidelity. The accepted
theory, however, at least according to one commentator, is that the
truth is preferable to fidelity. 28
Since the attorney-client privilege often prevents the lawyer
from revealing the truth,29 it has been subject to attack. 30 The clas
sic criticism was leveled by Jeremy Bentham, who believed that an
innocent party needs no privilege and that a guilty one should not
have the assistance provided by the privilege. 31 Other commentaAn order of men ... learned in the law and skilled in legal procedure,
is essential to the beneficient admi nistration of justice. The aid of such men
is now practically indispensable to the orderly, accurate and equitable deter
mination and adjustment of legal rights and duties. While the right of every
person to conduct his own litigation should be scrupulously respected, he
should not be discouraged, but rather encouraged, in early seeking the as
sistance or advice of a good lawyer upon any question of legal right.

[d.
23. E. W. CLEARY, supra note 20, at 176.
24. But see, Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between
Lawyer and Client, 16 CAL. L. REV. 487, 492 (1928).
25. [d.
26. [d. at 489.
27. [d. at 490. According to Dean Wigmore, a precondition for invoking the
privilege is that "[tlhe injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of the litigation." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, § 2285, at 527 (emphasis in
original).
28. Radin, supra note 24, at 490.
29. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, § 2291, at 554.
30. "Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental
principle that 'the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence.''' Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323,
331 (1950)). See Note, supra note 3, at 465. Contra, Louisell, Confidentiality, Con
formity, and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Courts Today, 31 TULANE L. REV. 101
(1956).
31. The man by the supposition is guilty; if not, by the supposition there is
nothing to betray: let the law adviser say every thing he has heard, every
thing he can have heard from his client, the client cannot have any thing to
fear from it ... What then, will be the consequence? That a guilty person
will not in general be able to derive quite so much assistance from his law
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tors, however, have observed that, human nature being what it is,
no client's story is likely to be either all good or all bad. 32 Thus,
the balance between maintaining the privilege and revealing the
truth is struck in favor of the privilege. Accordingly, the ultimate
goal of the attorney-client privilege is not to foster the client's com
plete, unfettered revelation of facts to his lawyer, but to encourage
the layman to retain a lawyer rather than to represent himself. The
end of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage the seeking of
counsel; the means is the safeguarding of confidences. As will be
shown, however, the American Bar Association's Code of Profes
sional Responsibility (the Code) and Defense Standards, which cur
rently33 govern ethical conduct, adhere to the policy of the privi
lege in an inconsistent manner. Moreover, a stronger allegiance to
the attorney-client privilege would dictate that lawyers not be
bound at all by ethical restraints in advocacy-·an unacceptable state
of affairs.
IV.

ATTORNEy-CLIENT PRIVILEGE'S SHORTCOMINGS
AS JUSTIFICATION FOR ETHICAL RULES

A.

Knowingly Using Client's Perjury

Employing the attorney-client privilege as a major justification
for the ethical rules has led to an inconsistent application of certain
rules. One example is the disparate treatment of client perjury in
civil, as contrasted with criminal, cases. In this regard, consider
the following situation.
Your client is indicted for assault and battery. He tells you
that he went up to the victim, unprovoked, and punched him in
the nose. This happened in New York, but your client wishes to
testify that he was in Nebraska at the time. Can you put him on
the stand? The answer, with minor qualifications, is "no" since the

advisor, in the way of concerting a false defence, as he may do at present....
J. BENTHAM, 5 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 302-04 (1827), quoted in D.
LOUISELL, J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 542 (3d ed.
1976).
Bentham's philosophy also led him to believe that a lawyer who defended a man
he knew was guilty was an accessory after the fact. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Crim
inal Defense Attorney-New Answers to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293, 293
n.2 (1980).
32. See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, § 2291, at 552.
33. Every state except California has adopted the CODE with minor variations.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, By State 1 (1977).
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Code forbids the use of perjured testimony.34 You may permit
your client to testify only if your client's intention to perjure him
self becomes apparent to you at a time when it is infeasible for you
to withdraw from the case35 or if the court forbids your with
drawal. 36 Even then, you must discourage your client from testi
fying. 37 If your client insists on testifying, you may only introduce
him to the trier of fact and allow him to tell his story in a narrative
fashion. 38 This procedure has been held not to violate the defen
dant's right to due process and a fair trial. 39 Conversely, in an anal
ogous civil litigation, under no circumstances may you put your cli
ent on the stand. 40 The Code does not differentiate between civil
and criminal cases in this regard. Rather, the American Bar Associ
ation (ABA) Defense Standards41 relax the ethical restrictions in a
criminal case. Also, a landmark ABA ethical opinion suggests that a
distinction be drawn between civil and criminal cases but gives no
supportive reasoning. 42 The combination of a criminal defendant's
right to counsel and his right to testify arguably requires a lawyer
34. Id. Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(4).
35. See, e.g., id. Disciplinary Rule 2-110(c) (lawyer may not withdraw, subject to
listed exceptions).
36. ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS § 7.7(c).
37. Id. § 7.7(a).
38. Id. § 7.7(c). "Criminal defendants in most European countries do not testify
under oath, but simply 'tell their stories.' " M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 31 (1975). See Silving, The Oath (Pt. 2), 68 YALE L.J. 1527,
1533-36 (1959).
39. Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1978). In Lowery, the de
fendant's conviction was reversed because his attorney moved to withdraw rather
than follow the ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS and allow the defendant to testify in nar
rative form without aid of counsel. The appellate court believed that the trial judge,
sitting without a jury, might have inferred the fact of perjury, even though counsel
gave no reason for withdrawing. Id. at 729-31. The court added that a lawyer's dis
closure of his client's perjury in a criminal case would deprive the defendant of ef
fective assistance of counsel. Id. at 730.
40. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule, 7-102(A)(4);
Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809, 847 (1977). The ABA DEFENSE
STANDARDS, which in certain instances permit perjury, apply only in criminal cases.
See note 37 supra.
41. ABA DEFENSE STANDAIms § 7.7(c).
42. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINION No. 287 (1953). Former
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 41 (1908) provided that "[wlhen a law
yer discovers that some fraud or deception has been practiced, which has unjustly
imposed upon the court or a party, he should endeavor to rectify it...." ABA OPIN
ION No. 287 held that "[w]e do not believe that Canoll 41 was directed at a [crimi
nal] case, ... but rather at one in which, in a civil suit, the lawyer's client has se
cured an improper advantage over the other- through fraud or deception." [d. at
612-13.
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to allow the accused to testify, even falsely.43 Recent cases, how
ever, have qualified the right to testify falsely. These cases hold
that even a criminal defendant has no right to take the stand if he
intends to lie. 44 For example, in State v. Whiteside,45 the court
said "A defendant is entitled to present his defense and to an op
portunity to testify fully . . . . [H]owever, he has no right to com
mit perjury, nor is an attorney permitted-much less required-to
aid in such a purpose. "46 Thus, the court held that an attorney was
not required to put his client on the stand knowing that he would
lie. 47 The opinion added that "A lawyer should not . . . decide
what is true and what is not unless there is compelling support for
his conclusion. "48 The court in Johnson v. United States 49 observed
that an ethical dilemma does not arise when the veracity of the de
fendant's testimony is conjectural but would arise either if the cli
ent has admitted guilt or inculpatory facts to his lawyer or if the
lawyer has corroborated his suspicion through an independent in
vestigation. 5o
If a criminal defendant has no right to take the stand to lie,
there may be no reason to distinguish between civil and criminal
cases in ethical terms. Civil litigants have rights parallel to those of
criminal defendants, including the right to be heard 51 and a privi
43. United States ex rei. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d U5, 120 (3d Cir. 1977).
The facts in Johnson were similar to those in Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th
Cir. 1978). See note 39 supra. In Johnson, however, counsel's belief that her client
was lying was unsubstantiated. Thus, while holding that defendant had the right to
testify and the right to counsel, the court added:
If an attorney faced with [client perjury 1 were in fact to discuss with the
Trial Judge his belief that his client intended to perjure himself, without
possessing a firm factual basis for that belief, he would be violating the duty
imposed upon him as defense counsel. ...
. . . It is apparent that an attorney may not volunteer a mere unsub
stantiated opinion that his client's protestations of innocence are perjured.
555 F.2d at 122. See generally Lefstein, The Criminal Defendant Who Proposes Per
jury: Rethinking the Defense Lawyer's Dilemma, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665, 679-83
(1978).
44. State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W. 2d 468 (Iowa 1978). Cf. Johnson v. United
States, 404 A.2d 162, 164 (App. D.C. 1979). See also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222,225 (1970) (privilege to testify does not include privilege to commit perjury).
45. 272 N.W.2d 468 (Iowa 1978).
46. Id. at 470.
47. Id.
48. Id., citing United States ex rei. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d U5, 120 (3d
CiT. 1977)). See note 43 supra for a discussion of Johnson.
49. 404 A.2d 162 (App. D.C. 1979).
50. Id. at 164.
51. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1975).
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lege against self-incrimination. 52 They also have a right to be heard
through counsel, insofar as the court cannot deny them retained
counsel. 53 Unlike criminal defendants, however, civil litigants do
not have the constitutional right to appointed counselor "effective
assistance of counsel. "54 Since criminal cases base the right to tes
tify on the sixth amendment, rather than on the fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination,55 this reliance on the sixth amend
ment may provide a compelling reason to distinguish ethically be
tween civil and criminal litigants' right to effective counsel. 56
B.

Using Perjury by Third Party

Another illustration of the attorney-client privilege's inade
quacy as justification for the ethical rules appears in the rule
against witness perjury. 57 Assume that your client's cousin wishes
to swear falsely that he was with your client in Nebraska at the
time the crime allegedly was committed in New York. You cannot
put the cousin on the stand. 58 Even if the defendant had a consti
tutional right to testify falsely, which he does not,59 he cannot,
through his lawyer, call a witness so inclined. 60 Yet the lawyer
probably acquired knowledge of the witness' intent to lie from the
client, or at least as a result of the representation, just as he did
when the client himself proposed to lie. 61
These situations, when analyzed in the context of the attorney
client privilege, illustrate that the ethical rules are contrary to their
purpose,62 to encourage people to seek legal counsel by safe
guarding their confidences. The client's confidences have been
used against him when, as illustrated above, he is precluded from
taking the stand in a civil case, when he suspiciously uses the nar
rative form in the criminal case, and when his cousin is prevented
from testifying falsely. The lawyer, knowing the entire story, will

52. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34,40 (1924).
53. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). See Note, The Right to Counsel
in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322 (1966).
54. Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978).
55. Id. at 732 (Hufstedler, J., concurring); United States ex reI. Wilcox v.
Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 121 (3d Cir. 1977).
56. See notes 103 & 104 infra and accompanying text.
57. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 7-101(8)(2).
58. In re Branch, 70 Cal. 2d 200, 449 P.2d 174, 74 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1969).
59. See note 44 supra.
60. Id. See Wolfram, supra note 40, at 864 n.214.
61. Wolfram, supra note 40, at 864 n.214.
62. See notes 20-30 supra and accompanying text.
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not represent the client as effectively as he would have had his cli
ent told him from the beginning that he was in Nebraska when the
crime was committed. The client, penalized for confiding in his
lawyer, thus is discouraged from seeking counselor from revealing
the truth to his lawyer should he hire counsel. Accordingly, the cli
ent might have done far better by representing himself. This result
is contrary to the Code's policy of encouraging litigants to seek ef
fective counsel. In one respect, the legal system is protected since
the client cannot both defraud the system and have a lawyer. Liti
gants must choose one or the other.

C.

Discrediting a Truthful Witness

The practice of discrediting a truthful witness by establishing a
bias further illustrates the de facto harm that legal representation
might cause.
Assume, for example, that in the above assault and battery
case your client is Jewish and the victim is a Nazi. After ques
tioning the Nazi at trial, you know that he is telling the truth be
cause he related the facts precisely as your client had. Can you,
with an eye toward concocting a frameup and establishing bias,
cross-examine the victim on the basis of his beliefs and his concom
itant hatred of your client? Initially, the difference between using
perjured testimony and discrediting a truthful witness appears
great. Ethically, however, the situations should not be treated dif
ferently.63 If the use of perjury amounts to making falsehood sound
like truth, then the discrediting of a truthful witness makes truth
sound like falsehood. A lawyer should not be permitted to establish
bias when he knows that whatever bias the witness has has not af
fected his testimony. The Code is silent on this issue. A lawyer, by
cross-examining the Nazi in an effort to depict him as biased, is not
using perjury or false evidence, nor is he perpetrating a
fraud as proscribed by the Code. 64 Arguably, the bias is irrelevant
in the lawyer's mind and thus cannot be adduced ethically under
the Code Disciplinary Rule 7-106(C)(1), which forbids the lawyer
63. See Noonan, supra note 9, at 1487. Contra, Pye, supra note 9, at 958 {inter
action of adversary system and obligation to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt
justifies tactic despite disagreement elsewhere}. Professor Freedman believes that
there is no ethical difference. He resolves the issue, however, in favor of both using
perjury and cross-examining the truthful witness. Freedman, supra note 2, at 1469.
64. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule
7-102{A}{4} {perjury and false evidence}; [d. Disciplinary Rule 7-102{A)(7} {counselor
assist in fraudulent conduct}.
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from alluding to matters he does not believe are relevant to the
case. 65
As an evidentiary matter, however, credibility is always a rele
vant issue,66 and impeachment on that basis is permitted. The fol
lowing ABA Defense Standard provides the only ethical guidance
on the matter:
A lawyer's belief that the witness is telling the truth does not
necessarily preclude appropriate cross-examination in all circum
stances, but may affect the method and scope of cross-exam
ination. He should not misuse the power of cross-examination
or impeachment by employing it to discredit or undermine a
witness if he knows the witness is testifying truthfully. 67

This provision is inadequate, however, because perplexing issues
are treated in too broad a manner. The prohibition against mis
using the power -of cross-examination provides little guidance, if
any, regarding particular tactics. For example, in the assault and
battery situation involving the Nazi, how can an attorney limit the
method and scope of cross-examination without undermining his
client's objectives? His duty to limit the examination is further evi
dence that, once again, a situation appears in which representation
by counsel may harm the effectiveness of a litigant's case.

D.

Unknowingly Using Client Perjury: Duty to Disclose to Court

In the perjury and cross-examination situations explored
above, the lawyer knew the facts before he examined or cross
examined the witness. A far different situation occurs when the
lawyer learns the truth after examination68 and may have an obliga
tion to reveal that his client lied. If fraud or perjury69 occurs dur
65. ld. Disciplinary Rule 7-106(C)(1) provides: "In appearing in his profes
sional capacity before tribunal, a lawyer shall not: State or allude to any matter that
he has no reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the case or that will not be sup
ported by admissible evidence."
66. See Pye, supra note 9, at 933-57 (relationship between ethics and evi
dence). "There is understandably a desire to avoid the conclusion that a lawyer can
do anything not prohibited by rules of evidence or procedure or law." ld. at 945.
67. ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS § 7.6(b). Professor Pye suggests that ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(2), prohibiting the
advancement of an unwarranted defense, might apply in a "general and ambiguous"
way. Pye, supra note 9, at 943.
68. See generally Brazil, Unanticipated Client Perjury and the Collision of
Rules of Ethics, Evidence, and Constitutional Law, 44 Mo. L. REV. 601 (1979);
Callan & David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclo
sure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332 (1976).
69. Perjury is a fraud upon a tribunal. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROFES
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ing the course of the representation and the lawyer learns about it
after it has occurred, the lawyer first must call on his client to
rectify the fraud or perjury: if the client refuses or is unable to do
so, the lawyer must do so. An exception is provided if the informa
tion is protected as a privileged communication. 7o A privileged
communication is defined as anything the lawyer learns in the
course of the professional relationship.71 Accordingly, if the lawyer
learns of his client's fraud from the client, it cannot be disclosed.
Information acquired while interviewing witne~ses, conducting a ti
tle search, or examining any other sources uncovered in the course
of representing a client also would be privileged. 72 There is some
doubt whether the duty to reveal testimonial fraud exists at all in a
criminal case because of the accused's right to effective assistance
of counsel. 73 The Code, however, draws no distinction between
civil and criminal cases. One commentator points out, though, fhat
all information gained during the attorney-client relationship usu
ally will be privileged in either case so a lawyer will rarely have to
reveal it. 74
The scope of the privileged information doctrine is narrowed
when the lawyer learns of relevant facts independent of the repre
sentation. When the lawyer acquires information from a third
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL OPINION No. 341 (1975); [d. FORMAL OPINION
No. 287 (1953); Brazil, supra note 68, at 602-04, nn. 1 & 5; Wolfram, supra note 60,
at 820, 864-66.
70. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule
7-102(B)(I).
71. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL OPIN
ION No. 341 (1975).
72. [d. See also ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, No. 41.
73. See Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1978). But see United
States ex rei. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977). For a discussion of
Johnson, see note 43 supra. The Johnson opinion stated that if an attorney discussed
his client's peIjury without possessing a firm factual basis for believing that his cli
. ent lied, he would be violating his client's constitutional rights. If the converse were
to be true, then possessing a factual basis might justify the lawyer's disclosure of per
jury. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (illegally obtained confession
may be used to impeach testimony at trial, since fifth amendment does not confer
privilege to lie).
74. Wolfram, supra note 40, at 864-65. Wolfram interprets ABA FORMAL OPIN
ION No. 341 (1975) to mean that in addition to having been learned from a source in
dependent of the representation, the information must have been learned before the
representation had begun or after it had ended. Id. at 837 n.106. Thus, he concludes,
"[t]he practical effect . . . is nearly to emasculate the affirmative disclosure duty
stated in [CPR] DR 7.-102(B)(1)." [d. Perhaps if the client had said, ''I've lived in the
home for 20 years," but you know that your sister had lived there until two years ago
at which time your client in fact had moved there, Wolfram would hold that disclo
sure is required.
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party, outside the scope of representing his client, the information
is not privileged and must be revealed. If a client were to repre
sent himself, the client would not be obligated to reveal such infor
mation. Thus, a client may be penalized for securing counsel. Con
sider the following situation. Your client is sued in contract for
$100,000. His only asset is a spacious home. The plaintiff moves to
attach it. Your client asks you how he can successfully oppose the
motion. You inform your client that he should file an affidavit ex
plaining that he has lived in the home for twenty years and has no
intention of selling it. In addition, he should declare that attach
ment would ruin his credit and consequently would prevent him
from financing his children's college education. Assume that this all
happens to be true except that, unknown to you, your client actu
ally intends to sell his home. A judge, conceivably, could consider
the affidavit and deny the plaintiff an attachment under the false
assumptien that the defendant planned to keep the house in his
possession as security. A few weeks later you are looking for a
home and see your client's house in the multiple listing service. It
was put on the market before he filed his affidavit but after the suit
was filed and you were retained as counsel. If your client sells his
house, the plaintiff will have no security for the judgment which he
may recover. Since you learned of the sale outside the scope of
representing your client, you must reveal this information to the
court or to the plaintiff if your client refuses to do SO.75 You would
have no such obligation, however, if you learned of the sale di
rectly from your client. 76 In fact, you would be bound not to dis
close the information, just as you would be bound if your client
told you about a past crime he had committed. 77 Regardless of the
75.

ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(I).

If your client had already sold the home, the fraud would be irremediable, in which
case that attorney may not have any duty to disclose.
76. The obvious question is whether the communication is truly confidential in
view of the client's having uttered it to a third party, such as to the broker or buyer,
as well as to his attorney. The rule is that it makes no difference that the information
. was available through nonconfidential sources or was received from a third party as
well as from the client. In these situations, no disclosure is permitted, as long as the
client intended no revelation by the lawyer. Doe v. A Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352, 1355
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (citing H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 105 (1953)), afI'd sub nom., Hall
v. A Corp., 453 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1972).
Also, one might argue that the privilege should not apply because the communi- .
cation that the client lied in his affidavit was not made for the purpose of seeking le
gal advice. But "[professional responsibility] ... looks beyond technical considera
tions of secrecy in the evidentiary sense and shields all information given by a client
to his attorney whether or not strictly confidential in nature." ld. at 1356.
77. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B)(1).

422

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:409

information's source, the client will regard your disclosure as a be
trayal. He justifiably may believe that he would have fared better
without a lawyer, or at least with a lawyer ignorant of all matters
except those learned from his client.

Duty to Disclose Third-Party Perjury and
Adverse Legal Authority
The Code penalizes the client for retaining counsel in several
related areas. According to the Code, if a favorable witness com
mits perjury, the lawyer must reveal the falsehood 78 since the
witness is not his client and the attorney-client privilege is inappli
cable. The lawyer, though, learned of the perjury as a result of the
representation just as he did when his client lied. 79
The Code penalizes the client who chooses to retain counsel
by requiring a lawyer to reveal to the court legal authority adverse
to his case. 80 The lawyer, however, need not disclose adverse
facts. 81 This distinguishes facts which are learned from the client,
and therefore are privileged, from the applicable law, which can be
found in books which are available to all. 82 Since the law, by its
nature, is public information, the lawyer can be candid with the
E.

The crime, peIjury, already has occurred. A lawyer is not required to, but may reveal
a future crime. The future sale of the home, however, is a fraud, not a crime; there
fore, the lawyer may not reveal it. See id. Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3). See also
note 123 infra.
78. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(2).
Wolfram, supra note 40, at 864.
79. Wolfram, supra note 40, at 864 n.214.
80. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 7-106(B)(I):
"In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose: legal authority in the
controlling jurisdiction known to him to be directly adverse to the position of his cli
ent and which is not disclosed by opposing counsel." In addition, a lawyer may not
knowingly make a false statement of law. Ashbaugh v. State, 400 N.E.2d 767, 772
(Ind. 1980). ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule
7-102(A)(5). Not only would direct misstatements, such as "this is a case of first im
pression," "authorities are in conflict on the point," or "the case holds X," come un
der the purview of this section but so would indirect or interpretative misstatements,
such as "this case clearly comes within the rule of A," or "the unmistakable trend in
the law is toward B." Uviller, Zeal and Frivolity: The Ethical Duty of the Appellate
Advocate to Tell the Truth About the Law, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 729, 731-33 (1978).
See also Seidenfeld, Professional Responsibility Before Reviewing Courts, 25
DEPAUL L. REV. 264 (1976).
81. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B)(l);
MODEL RULES 3.1, supra note 4, Comment, Disclosure of facts; N.Y. COUNTY LAW
YER'S Assoc. COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS' (hereinafter referred to as N.Y.
COUNTY OPINIONS), OPINION No. 309 (1933) (lawyer need not disclose existence of
unfavorable witness).
82. R. ARONSON & D. WECKSTEIN, supra note 1, at 298-99.
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court without breaching his client's confidence. Also, the judge,
who often requests that the lawyer brief the law, relies on the law
yer's research 83 and takes a passive role in the presentation of the
facts. These explanations for revelation of legal authority to the
court ignore the ultimate objective of the attorney-client privilege:
To encourage the seeking of counsel. 84 In addition, the client is
penalized for hiring a lawyer in the above situations: a pro se party
might misstate the law, but retained counsel cannot. Nor may the
attorney knowingly make a false statement of fact,85 something
which the client might be tempted to do despite the sanctions for
perjury. Privilege or not, the client whose lawyer reveals adverse
legal authority will feel no less betrayed than the client whose se
crets are disclosed or used against him.
V.

THE PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
VIs-A-VIS CONTRACT THEORY

In 1977, the ABA established the Commission on Evaluation
of Professional Standards, known as the Kutak Commission, to con
sider preparation of a complete overhaul of the ABA Code of Pro
fessional Responsibility.86 After over two years of reevaluating "the
fundamental tenets of ethics and self-regulation in the legal profes
sion"87 the Commission prepared and distributed the Discussion
Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Discussion
Draft).88 According to the report's preface, the rules "simply pro
vide a legal framework for the ethical practice of law,"89 a frame
work that is based on both the current Code and on the continuing
evolution of ethical thought, specifically that of the 1970's.
The Discussion Draft has not been adopted or approved by
the ABA's House of Delegates and, therefore, does not represent
the policy of the ABA.90 Instead, the text is open for continuing re
visions until the proper ethical balance can be achieved. Fearing
that the Model Rules might be approved without any real scrutiny,

83.
84.
85.
86.
A.B.A.].
87.
88.
89.
90.

Vargas v. McNamara, 608 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1979).
See notes 21-30 supra and accompanying text.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(5).
See R. Kutak, Coming: The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct 66
46, 47 (1980).
MODEL RULES, supra note 4, at 1 (preface).
See id. at 1.
[d. at 2 (scope & definitions).
[d.
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one commentatorS 1 has suggested that the legal profession should
critically debate the new and controversial directions proposed by
the Model Rules. Despite potential revisions in the Discussion
Draft, if the Model Rules are approved in substantially the same
form as proposed, they will represent a significant new approach to
the regulation of ethical conduct having far-reaching effects for ev
ery attorney in the United States.
A.

Civil Cases

In civil cases, the Model Rules differ from the present Code
in three important respects. First, a 'lawyer must disclose false
evidence, even if the client's confidences are thereby violated. 92
Second, a lawyer may not offer evidence which is substantially
misleading. 93 Third, the lawyer must correct any manifest mis
apprehension resulting from a previous representation he has
made. 94
The following situation illustrates conduct which would be
considered unethical under the Model Rules but which would be
permissible under the present Code. Assume that your client has
committed rape. At the time of the crime's commission he had no
unusual identifying marks on his body. The victim sues your client
in a civil action. Shortly afterward your client undergoes an appen
dectomy. The operation leaves a large scar near his genitals, and
he informs you of it. At trial, you ask the victim on cross
examination whether the defendant had any identifying marks, and

91. Kaufman, A Critical First Look at the Model Rules of Professional Con
duct, 66 A.B.A.]. 1074, 1075 (1980).
MODEL RULE 3.1(b) provides:
Except as provided in paragraph (f) [criminal cases), if a lawyer discov
ers that evidence or testimony presented by the lawyer is false, the lawyer
shall disclose that fact and take suitable measures to rectify the conse
quences, even if doing so requires disclosure of a confidence of the client or
disclosure that the client is implicated in the falsification.
93. MODEL RULE 3.1(a)(3) provides: "A lawyer shall not: . . . except as pro
vided in paragraph (f), offer evidence that the lawyer is convinced beyond a reason
able doubt is false, or offer without suitable explanation evidence that the lawyer
knows is substantially misleading...."
94. MODEL RULE 3.1(d)(2) provides: "Except as provided in paragraph (f), a
lawyer shall disclose a fact known to the lawyer, even if the fact is adverse, when
disclosure: ... is necessary to correct a manifest misapprehension resulting from a
previous representation the lawyer has made to the tribunal." Whether the words
"the lawyer has made" mean the lawyer, but not the client, is not clear. In MODEL
RULE 4.2(b)(2), involVing negotiation, the Discussion Draft specifically includes mis
apprehensions created by the client as well as those formulated by the lawyer is im
posing a duty of disclosure upon counsel.

92.
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she responds in the negative. At the close of the government's
case, your defense consists entirely of asking the defendant to re
veal his scar in court. The jury assumes that the scar was there at
the time of the rape, doubts the veracity of the victim, and acquits
your client. No perjury, fraud, or false evidence was offered at
trial. The argument that the exhibition was irrelevant, and there
fore unethical under the Code, is a weak one. Thus, although your
trial tactic was misleading, the Code would seem to permit it. Tes
timony is misleading if, irrespective of its lack of falsity, it is likely
to impede further inquiry into the truth. 95 The Model Rules would
prohibit this tactic as "substantially misleading. "96 If the attorney
learned of his client's deceit after the fact, he would be required to
disclose it, regardless of the source of his knowledge. The trend
clearly is toward a "one" rating: 97 the Model Rules encourage the
lawyer to serve as an officer of the court by seeking true justice
rather than serving as a mere mouthpiece for his client.
B.

Criminal Cases

In criminal cases, on the other hand, the Model Rules are
closer to the "ten" rating,98 where the client's wishes prevail over
legal ethics. Not only are the civil provisions inapplicable, but if
the accused so insists, the lawyer must offer false evidence when
"applicable law requires that the lawyer comply with such a de
mand. "99 The Discussion Draft of the Model Rules does not ex
plain the quoted portion. The commentary, however, states that a
criminal lawyer's ethical obligations are subordinate to his loyalty
to his client. 1oo The commentaries thus supplement the provisipns
of the Model Rules in a manner similar to that used in the Uniform
Commercial Code. 101 The effect of these comments as persuasive
authority, therefore, is difficult to predict.
For reasons previously stated,102 the law does not seem to re
quire that this "no holds barred" attitude of the Model Rules be
95. The MODEL RULES do not define "misleading." The definition in the text
is that of the author. See Pye, supra note 9, at 942 (implied equation of suppression
of truth with misleading of jury).
96. See note 93 supra.
97. See text accompanying notes 9-15 supra.

98. [d.
99. MODEL RULES 3.1(f)(3).
100. [d. (Comment) (Perjury by a criminal defendant).
101. See Kaufman, supra note 91, at 1076 (author expressed "uneasy feeling
that often the comments range far beyond the text of the rule"). [d.
102. See notes 42-47 supra and accompanying text.
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maintained in criminal cases. Nonetheless, there are several rea
sons for relaxing the ethical obligations of a criminal lawyer. First,
and most importantly, the accused faces a loss of liberty or even
life, whereas the civil litigant faces loss of property. Second, when
a criminal client is acquitted, no particular party loses, only the
sovereign. 103 Third, our system of jurisprudence frowns upon any
apparatus forcing the accused to play a role in his own conviction.
The more the defendant prejudices his own case by talking to his
lawyer, the less the prosecution must bear its burden of proof.
Were criminal defense lawyers forced to disclose false evidence,
they might be subjected to interrogation by the prosecution. 1 0 4
These issues currently are unresolved. They do indicate, however,
that disclosure can severely prejudice a client's case.

C.

Contract Theory

As shown in both criminal and civil cases, the existing ethical
prohibitions against the use of perjury and false evidence, as well
as the requirement that a lawyer disclose the perjury of a favorable
witness, inhibit the client's full disclosure of facts to his lawyer.
Moreover, requiring the disclosure of adverse legal authority and
client fraud which is discovered independently of the representa
tion discourages individuals from securing counsel. Current princi
ples of professional responsibility therefore, contrary to their stated
purpose, are based only partially upon the attorney-client privi
lege. A stronger commitment to confidentiality, on the other hand,
would exclude ethics from a lawyer's obligations. Stricter con
fidentiality would transform the lawyer into a mouthpiece for his
client, possibly leading him to disregard the truth. 105
This is not to imply that confidentiality is undesirable or that
the attorney-client privilege should be abolished. Rather, this arti
cle suggests that a client should not be permitted to use his attor
Wolfram, supra note 40, at 859-60.
104. See, e.g., People v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d 436,277 P.2d 94 (1954). In Kor,
a judge asked an attorney whether his client had told him a different story. The ap
pellate court opined that the lawyer should have opted for a contempt citation and
jail rather than answer the judge. Id. at 447, 277 P.2d at 101 (Skinn, J., concurring).
See also 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, at § 2291; Sedler & Simeone, The Realities of
Attorney-Client Confidences, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 1,9 (1963). Professor Mellinkoff notes
that "[t]he privilege [against self-incrimination] reinforces the presumption of inno
cence, requiring the accuser to gather evidence to prove a man guilty rather than re
sort to the simpler, faster expedient of squeezing his genitals until he confesses." D.
MELLINKOFF, supra note 1, at 153.
105. Uviller, supra note 9, at 1072.
103.
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ney, whether the attorney acts through ignorance or purposeful in
tent, to catapult himself to a more advantageous position by using
falsehoods and labeling them "confidential." Let us reconsider the
hypothetical attachment situation. 106 The lawyer's expertise in
drafting the affidavit permitted the client unjustly to alienate his
sole asset from attachment. Similarly, having the defendant in the
hypothetical rape situation display his scar was the lawyer's strata
gem. In each of these situations no worthwhile purpose would be
served by having the lawyer remain silent or withdraw from the
case. Withdrawal or silence is no different than an active betrayal
of the court. Thus, the potential for abuse requires a delicate bal
ance between the need for confidentiality and the improper use of
attorneys by deceitful litigants. The contract theoryl07 of ethics
provides a better balance because it does not penalize the client for
employing an attorney. This balance is achieved by a mutual agree
ment that the lawyer will zealously represent the client, but only
up to the point where an affirmative breach by the client gives him
an unfair advantage. When that occurs, the lawyer must rectifY the
situation.
Applying a contract theory of ethics does not penalize the cli
ent for hiring a lawyer. In each of the hypothetical situations pro
posed, the client would not have gained the advantage without his
lawyer. The client betrayed the trust. The client, not the lawyer,
breached the ethical contract. The lawyer's responsibility should be
to ensure that the injured party, either the opponent or the court,
is restored to the position it would have occupied had the client
been truthful.
While the contract theory and the Model Rules appear to
deemphasize the attorney-client privilege, they do not signal its
death. Nor do they metamorphose the. adversary system of justice
into an inquisitional one. They do not require the lawyer to dis
close adverse facts per se. 108 For example, if six persons witnessed
an event involving a client and five would give unfavorable testi
106. See notes 75-77 supra and accompanying text.
107. See text accompanying notes 1 & 2 supra.
108. See note 81 supra and accompanying text. See also Pye, supra note 9,
at 942:
The failure to reveal does, of course, reduce the likelihood of the truth
emerging from the trial. ... However, a distinction should be made between
counsel's obligation not to take action that will suppress the truth or mislead
the jury . . . and an obligation to take affirmative action to produce addi
tional evidence....
Id.
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mony, the lawyer could call the one favorable witness to the stand
without presenting the others.109 The lawyer in no way is asserting
that the other witnesses do not exist. He merely is establishing
that this particular witness has a particular recollection of the facts.
The lawyer's actions are not likely to prevent further inquiry by
opposing counsel. Perjury and false or misleading evidence, how
ever, may have such an effect. Consider another example. If a law
yer representing the seller of a used home knows that the roof
leaks, he need not disclose it to the buyer. If asked about it, the
lawyer can refuse to answer, but he cannot represent that the roof
does not leak. If his client misrepresents the roofs condition, un
der the contract theory and the Model Rules the lawyer must dis
close the actual condition. If the lawyer was aware of a title defect
but the seller nonetheless wished to convey by a warranty deed,
the lawyer could not permit him to do so. If the client insisted, the
lawyer would have to withdraw but would not have to disclose his
client's fraudulent intentions to the buyer because the client then
would be in a worse position than if he had not retained a law
yer. 110 The client has neither gained nor lost by way of counsel,
nor should he. The Model Rules and contract theory dictate these
results.
It is fundamental that a lawyer must know all the facts if he is
to help his client. But does this mean to help him win or to help
him establish the truth? It is not difficult to envision a client who
might withhold a fact which he considers harmful and which actu
ally would hurt his chances of winning. Imagining a client con
cealing a fact which he regards as harmful but which actually vindi
cates his position is more difficult. lll Therefore, under the Model
Rules and under the contract theory, no client who is entitled to
victory under the law will lose by reason of withholding informa
tion from, or lying to, his lawyer since the truth eventually w~ll be
established.
109. N.Y. COUNTY OPINION No. 309 (1933). See also R. ARONSON & D.
WECKSTEIN, supra note 1, at 297:
It would be improper to assert in court that the fact was X when the
lawyer knew from evidence in his possession that the fact was Y. Where,
however, the lawyer's investigation has produced reliable evidence of both
X and Y as the fact, it probably would not be unethical to introduce only the
evidence supporting X, which favored the client's position.
1l0. N.Y. COUNTY OPINION No. 90 (1916), cited in T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 46 (1976).
lli. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2291, at 551 (citing Flight v. Robinson, 8
Beav. 22, 36, 50 Eng. Rep. 9, 14 (Rolls Ct. 1844) (Lord Langdale, M.R.)).
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Some comm~ntators, however, are overzealous in their sup
port of the client, to the detriment of the truth. Professor Freed
man, for example, believes that a "sacred trust"112 requires a law
yer to discredit a truthful witness and to allow his client to commit
perjury. The foundation of his argument, though, collapses when
he assumes that his client is "falsely accused. "113 Naturally, if the
lawyer knew that the client was innocent, perhaps a sentimental
argument could be made that he would be justified in fighting the
prosecution with false or misleading evidence. 114 We must assume,
though, that Freedman does not know that his client is innocent. If
Freedman does know, then he should be a witness in the case and
not the advocate 115 for the only way he truly could be sure of inno
cence is by personally having observed exculpatory evidence. us
Freedman would know that his client was innocent if, for example,
he witnessed the complainant throwing the first punch or if the
complainant, during an interview, informed him that the defend
ant, though innocent, was such a bad guy that a frameup was in or
der. Ethically, had Freedman seen or heard these events, he
would have had to testifY for his client rather than represent him.
Conversely, the argument has been advanced that a lawyer
can never know if his client is lying1l7 or if an adverse witness is
telling the truth,118 even if the client so informs him. If lawyers
were incapable of discerning falsehood,~ there could be no ethics. If
lawyers could never determine what was false, they could not be
responsible for avoiding or revealing falsehood. Court decisions, 119
the ABA Defense Standards,120 and even Freedman121 acknowl
edge that it is possible for lawyers to know if clients are lying or if
witnesses are telling the truth.

112.
113.

114.
115.
requires
called as

M. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 5.
Freedman, supra note 2, at 1474.
See Curtis, supra note 2, at 8.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 5-101(B)
a lawyer to withdraw from or refuse to accept a case in which he may be
a witness.
See Selinger, The Perry Mason Perspective and Others: A Critique of

116.
Reductionist Thinking About the Ethics of Untruthful Practices by Lawyers for «In
nocent" Defendants, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 631, 654 (1978).
117. D. MELLINKOFF, supra note 1, at 149-50 (a person may confess to shield
another, because of a mental aberration, or through ignorance of the critical fact, for
example that a person he left for dead recovered).
118. Pye, supra note 9, at 945.
119. See, e.g., State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 470-71 (Iowa 1978).
120. ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS § 7.7 (Comment).
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Undoubtedly, there is a distinction between passively refusing
to employ false mechanisms beforehand by not allowing a witness
to perjure himself and actively eradicating lies after the fact. 122 The
first involves no disclosure of the client's secrets while the second
does. A lawyer who knows in advance that his client plans to use
perjury or false or misleading evidence must withdraw or success
fully convince his client to proceed ethically. Neither the Code,
the Model Rules, nor the contract theory of ethics imposes upon
the lawyer the duty to reveal such intentions of his client. 123 Theo
retically, the worst that can happen, from the client's standpoint, is
that he will have to take the lawyer's advice or seek another law
yer. 124 If he is unfortunate enough to run into a string of ethical
lawyers, he will have to litigate honestly or represent himself.
Under the Model Rules and the contract theory, however,
once false tactics are employed, the lawyer actually may have to re
veal them but then only to the extent necessary to erase the falsely·
gained advantage. He may, in effect, have to call his client or a fa
vorable witness a liar. The lawyer can spare the client such embar
rassment by explaining the ethical contract at the outset of the pro
fessional relationship.125 The client then will be more likely to tell
the entire story in advance. 126 The considerations and advice are
similar to those traditionally involved when a criminal defendant
elects to testify in his own defense. The client thereby waives his
privilege not to incriminate himself. 127 The attorney should be able
to waive the attorney-client privilege to the extent necessary to
correct any fraud in his client's testimony. The privileges are re
lated, and both are based largely upon the principle of privacy. 128

121. Freedman, supra note 2, at 1472.
122. Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1978). See note 39 supra.
123. Under the CODE, a lawyer may, not must, disclose his client's intent to
commit a crime. Disclosure ofJraud is not mentioned. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3). In civil cases, at least, disclosure in
cludes contemplated perjury. The MODEL RULES contain a similar provision,
1. 7(c)(2), but add that a lawyer must disclose a client's contemplated crime if it in
volves death or serious bodily harm. MODEL RULES 1.7(b). See note 2 supra.
124. The reason that ethical restraints do not necessarily result in a clients' em
ployment of unethical lawyers is explained in Sedler & Simeone, supra note 104,
at 8-9.
125. Lefstein, supra note 43, at 688-92; Polster, supra note 9, at 38-39; Pye, su
pra note 9, at 950.
126. Polster, supra note 9, at 39 (initial candor might encourage better attorney
client relations).
127. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155-56 (1958).
128. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S.
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The client's privacy is lost by making public his version of the
story.
There is little justification for the current rule that a lawyer
cannot aid a client in deceit; but that if he does so unknowingly
and later learns of the deceit, he cannot rectify the situation. Tort
law imposes no affirmative duty upon a person to rescue unless, of
course, he has caused the peril. 129 The lawyer, since he has helped
the client to deceive the court, should not be permitted or forced
to walk away. Rather he should be permitted to rectify a situation
by disclosing the truth to the court and thereby preventing the cli
ent from gaining any unfair advantage.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The principles incorporated into the Model Rules, and dis
cussed in this article, will not discourage those with legal problems
from seeking counsel. It has been suggested that even if the
attorney-client privilege were abolished, the legal profession would
survive. 130 The inability of nonlawyers to prepare pleadings, to ad
equately investigate facts and employ discovery techniques, and to
present admissible evidence surely will offset the risk of dimin
ished confidentiality and will lead potential litigants to counsel. 131
The contract theory, like all theories, cannot address every po
tential situation and leaves several questions unanswered. For ex
ample, what should a lawyer do if he discovers his client's perjury
long after the case is over? What if his client lies about a matter
not material to the case but which, if the truth were known, would
be embarrassing? Despite its shortcomings, however, the contract
approach is consistent with traditional ethical notions that a lawyer
should not, wittingly or unwittingly, be a party to deceit. A trial is,
above all, a search for the truth. 132 No lawyer should have toapol
ogize to a client whose deceit he is ethically bound to reveal. On.
the contrary, a lawyer should be bound to reveal his client's deceit.
When Alfred JodI's case was lost and he was sitting in his jail cell
at Nuremberg waiting to be hanged, he was told that his lawyer
was ashamed to visit him. JodI responded that "I must rather be
ashamed to have brought him to this situation. "133
406,415-16 (1966); D. MELLINKOFF, supra note 1, at 137; LouiselJ, supra note 30, at
110-15.
129. Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 321-22, 155 A.2d 343-46 (1959).
130. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2291, at 554.
131. See Note, supra note 53, at 1331.
132. Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
133. E. DAVIDSON, THE TRIAL OF THE GERMANS 363 (1966).
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The idea that a lawyer should, in' some instances, reveal his
client's secrets to remedy injustice is not a novel one. 134 It simply
has not been applauded. 135 The attorney-client privilege has ele
vated confidentiality above candor toward the court. By exploring
the policies underlying the attorney-client privilege, rather than
the mechanics of solving particular situations, attorneys should be
better equipped to understand their ethical obligations vis-a-vis
their client, their adversary, the court system, and the search for
the truth.

134. See, e.g., MODEL RULES 3.1{b), (d)(2); ABA FORMAL OPINION No. 287
(Brucker & White, dissenting), reprinted in 39 A.B.A.]. 983, 985 (1953); Frankel, su
pra note 11, at 1031; P0lster, supra note 9, at 34; notes 92 & 94 supra.
135. See, e.g., More Objections to Proposed Ethics Code, 8 Mass. L. Weekly
827, 840, May 19, 1980, at 14, col. 4 (comment by Professor Gray Thoron of Cornell
Law School that a lawyer should not be a "tattletale").

